Re: dblink connection security
От | Joe Conway |
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Тема | Re: dblink connection security |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 46925B95.6020504@joeconway.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: dblink connection security (Gregory Stark <stark@enterprisedb.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: dblink connection security
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Список | pgsql-patches |
Gregory Stark wrote: > "Joe Conway" <mail@joeconway.com> writes: > >> Stephen Frost wrote: >>> * Joe Conway (mail@joeconway.com) wrote: >>>> There are none installed by default -- that's the point. >>> Uhh... None what? Functions in untrusted languages? That's certainly >>> not the case, there's a whole slew of them, from boolin to >>> generate_series and beyond. They're available to regular users, even! >> Get serious. Internal functions are specifically designed and maintained to be >> safe within the confines of the database security model. We are discussing >> extensions to the core, all of which must be installed by choice, by a superuser. > > That doesn't mean they shouldn't be concerned with security. Of course they should be concerned with security. Its the job of the DBA/superuser to be concerned with security, and therefore they ought to know what the implications are for what they install, before they install it. > Consider dblink as an entirely separate product which depends on Postgres the > way Postgres depends on the OS. We discussing how the dblink software should > behave when installed with *its* default configuration. And the the security escalation scenario, which is a consequence of the DBA's inadequate understanding of the security setup of the system in the first place, has now been closed for them. Granted, this was an easy enough mistake to make, so I agree that what we've done to close it is a good thing. But if you know of a security risk related to using libpq with a password authenticated connection, let's hear it. Joe
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