Re: dblink connection security
От | Joe Conway |
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Тема | Re: dblink connection security |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 4691AEBA.9080206@joeconway.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: dblink connection security (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: dblink connection security
Re: dblink connection security |
Список | pgsql-patches |
Tom Lane wrote: > Gregory Stark <stark@enterprisedb.com> writes: >> My objection is that I think we should still revoke access for non-superuser >> by default. The patch makes granting execute reasonable for most users but >> nonetheless it shouldn't be the default. > >> Being able to connect to a postgres server shouldn't mean being able to open >> tcp connections *from* that server to arbitrary other host/ports. > > You forget that dblink isn't even installed by default. I could see > having some more verbiage in the documentation explaining these possible > security risks, but making it unusable is an overreaction. > Agreed. If you are going to argue that we should revoke access for non-superusers by default for dblink, then you are also arguing that we should do the same for every function created with any untrusted language. E.g. as I pointed out to Robert last week, just because an unsafe function is created in plperlu, it doesn't mean that a non-superuser can't run it immediately after it is created. There is no difference. It is incumbent upon the DBA/superuser to be careful _whenever_ they create any function using an untrusted language. Joe
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