Re: password is no required, authentication is overridden
От | Andrew Dunstan |
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Тема | Re: password is no required, authentication is overridden |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 44BE2BB6.9010002@dunslane.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: password is no required, authentication is overridden ("Hiroshi Saito" <z-saito@guitar.ocn.ne.jp>) |
Ответы |
Re: password is no required, authentication is overridden
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Hiroshi Saito wrote: > From: "Andrew Dunstan" > >> Thomas Bley wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> + The .pgpass file will be automatically created if you're using >>> pgAdmin III with "store password" being enabled in the connection >>> settings. >>> >> >> It strikes me that this is actually a bad thing for pgadmin3 to be >> doing. It should use its own file, not the deafult location, at least >> if the libpq version is >= 8.1. We provided the PGPASSFILE >> environment setting just so programs like this could use alternative >> locations for the pgpass file. Otherwise, it seems to me we are >> violating the POLS, as in the case of this user who not unnaturally >> thought he had found a major security hole. > > > Ummm, The function which pgAdmin offers is the optimal in present. I > do not think that PGPASSFILE avoids the danger clearly. Probably, It > is easy for the user who is malicious in the change to find it. I don't understand what you are saying here. The problem is that it is not clear (at least to the original user, and maybe to others) that when pgadmin3 saves a password it saves it where it will be found by all libpq clients, not just by pgadmin3. How is that optimal? If pgadmin3 were to save it in a non-standard location and then set PGPASSFILE to point to that location that would solve the problem. Or maybe it should offer a choice. Either way, how would a malicious user affect that? PGPASSFILE only contains a location, not the contents of the file, so exposing it is not any great security issue, as long as the location is itself protected. > I consider it to be a problem that the password is finally PlainText. > Then, I made the proposal before. However, > It was indicated that deliberation is required again..... I want to > consider a good method again. Is there any proposal with good someone? > Use of plaintext in pgpass files is a different problem. If you really want high security you need to get out of the game of shared passwords altogether, and use client certificates, IMNSHO. cheers andrew
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