Re: pg_hba.conf alternative
От | Andrew Dunstan |
---|---|
Тема | Re: pg_hba.conf alternative |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 43EA0956.9010906@dunslane.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: pg_hba.conf alternative (Q Beukes <pgsql-dev@list.za.net>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Q Beukes wrote: >Well, > >I am not looking for 100% security. I know that full access if full access, >and that even if you were to encrypt the system through Postgre the >determined >person WILL always be able to get it out if they have system level access. > >All I wanted to do was to prevent the basic SQL/Linux literate user from >accessing >the databases. At the moment it is very easy for them to access the data. > mechanism is there for a reason: >I trust that they wont go as far as overwriting the system with custom >compiled >version, or copying the data and so forth. It just that we would feel >much better >if we knew the data wasn't as open as it is now, with a simple pg >restart it is all >open? > >Can this only be done by maybe modifying the source to make pg_hba >fields statically >compiled into the executable? > > Of course it would be possible to hardcode the values - it's a SMOC. But nobody round here is likely to do the work reuired, since nobody believes it's worth doing, I believe. This mechanism you object to is there for a reason: if you lock yourself out of the database you can recover from the error. The solution you are proposing is therefore a huge footgun. And your user with basic linux/sql knowledge would still be able to see data fly by, for example, logging statements, or watching network traffic. How hard is it to run ethereal, after all, or tail a log file? There is even a module for ethereal that understands the postgres wire protocol. You aren't asking for security - you are asking for the illusion of security, which many would argue is worse than no security at all. cheers andrew
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