Re: [pgadmin-hackers] Client-side password encryption
От | Christopher Kings-Lynne |
---|---|
Тема | Re: [pgadmin-hackers] Client-side password encryption |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 43AB88E3.7020500@familyhealth.com.au обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [pgadmin-hackers] Client-side password encryption (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: [pgadmin-hackers] Client-side password encryption
|
Список | pgsql-hackers |
>>So, can I specify the password to pg_connect() as >>'md5127349123742342344234'? > > Certainly not. We'd hardly be worrying about obscuring the original > password if the encrypted version were enough to get in with. AndrewSN can't post at the moment, but asked me to post this for him: "Knowing the md5 hash is enough to authenticate via the 'md5' method in pg_hba.conf, even if you don't know the original password. Admittedly you have to modify libpq to do this, but this isn't going to stop an attacker for more than 5 seconds." I'll add my own note that never sending the cleartext password does not necessarily improve PostgreSQL security, but certainly stops someone who sniffs the password from then using that cleartext password to get into other applications. If all they can get is the md5 hash, then all they can get into is PostgreSQL. Chris
В списке pgsql-hackers по дате отправления: