Re: For review: Server instrumentation patch
От | Andrew Dunstan |
---|---|
Тема | Re: For review: Server instrumentation patch |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 42E40141.7010501@dunslane.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: For review: Server instrumentation patch ("Magnus Hagander" <mha@sollentuna.net>) |
Ответы |
Re: For review: Server instrumentation patch
Re: For review: Server instrumentation patch |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Magnus Hagander wrote: >>>How is this different from the fact that the superuser can >>> >>> >>already use >> >> >>>COPY to accomplish the same thing? >>> >>> >>COPY can accomplish a few of the same things, much less >>conveniently (for instance, it's darn hard to write an >>arbitrary binary file through COPY). >> >> > >Right. But the *security* problem is more or less equal. If somebody >hacks your superuser account, they can make at least almost the same >amount of damage. It may take a little more work, but if you just want >to kill the system by overwriting files, or overwriting say the password >file, it's just as easy. And if what you want to do is stick some kind >of executable o nthe system, you can just wrap it in a shellscript that >will unpack it. > > It could be argued that there should be provision for a limitation on the locations in which COPY can write (and maybe read) files. If COPY is a security hole then we should close it, not use that as precedent to open another hole. cheers andrew
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