Re: Catalog Security WAS: Views, views, views: Summary
От | Christopher Kings-Lynne |
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Тема | Re: Catalog Security WAS: Views, views, views: Summary |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 4285C0FB.6090604@familyhealth.com.au обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Catalog Security WAS: Views, views, views: Summary (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>) |
Ответы |
Re: Catalog Security WAS: Views, views, views: Summary
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
>>Tom mentioned that he had not had these security concerns raised before. From >>my point of view I just have no idea about the level of information offered >>to any given user and am scared to run PostgreSQL in an ISP shared >>environment because of it. I am sure I can secure people from connecting to >>a db by refusing them access in pg_hba.conf. But I'm unsure of exactly what >>that buys me, and what is doesn't. > > It's certainly also a concern of mine that any given use can see every > table in the database. I see that as a definite problem and just > assumed it was already on the radar and something that was planned to be > fixed. It astounds me that the claim is that such security is > impossible. > > It bothers me a great deal that I can't control very easily what a given > user can see when they connect over ODBC or via phppgadmin in terms of > schemas, tables and columns. I fixed this in application code in > phppgadmin but that's clearly insufficient since it doesn't do anything > for the other access methods. Modifiying phpPgAdmin is useless - people can query the catalogs manually. Hackers - we get an email about information hiding in shared postgresql/phppgadmin installations at least once a fortnight :) Chris
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