Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow
От | David Garamond |
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Тема | Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 413DE036.4080704@zara.6.isreserved.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow
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Список | pgsql-general |
Tom Lane wrote: >>I read that the password hash in pg_shadow is salted with username. Is >>this still the case? If so, since probably 99% of all PostgreSQL has >>"postgres" as the superuser name, wouldn't it be better to use standard >>Unix/Apache MD5 hash instead? > > How does that improve anything? If we add a random salt into it, we'd > have to store the salt in pg_shadow, so there wouldn't be any secrecy > added --- an attacker who can read pg_shadow could see the salt too. Consider someone who creates a long list of: MD5( "postgres" + "aaaaaaaa" ) MD5( "postgres" + "aaaaaaab" ) MD5( "postgres" + "aaaaaaac" ) ... Now if he has access to other people's pg_shadow, he can compare the hashes with his dictionary. Replacing "postgres" with a random salt defeats this dictionary attack (and thus he will have to resort to brute force). > (Actually, an attacker who can read pg_shadow is already superuser, > so it's not clear there's anything left to hide from him anyway.) But consider someone who finds a harddisk or tape containing a database backup... he can then gain access to the real, online database. -- dave
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