Re: let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 39752.1658420887@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER
Re: let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes: > Currently, it's possible to remove the rolissuper bit from the > bootstrap superuser, but this leaves that user - and the system in > general - in an odd state. The bootstrap user continues to own all of > the objects it owned before, e.g. all of the system catalogs. Direct > DML on system catalogs is blocked by pg_class_aclmask_ext(), but it's > possible to do things like rename a system function out of the way and > create a new function with the same signature. Therefore, creating a > new superuser and making the original one a non-superuser is probably > not viable from a security perspective, because anyone who gained > access to that role would likely have little difficulty mounting a > Trojan horse attack against the current superusers. True, but what if the idea is to have *no* superusers? I seem to recall people being interested in setups like that. On the whole I don't have any objection to your proposal, I just worry that somebody else will. Of course there's always "UPDATE pg_authid SET rolsuper = false", which makes it absolutely clear that you're breaking the glass cover. regards, tom lane
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