Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
От | Joe Conway |
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Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 361c6dfd-5797-8f5c-89d9-517f2839be26@joeconway.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) (Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 7/10/19 3:53 PM, Alvaro Herrera wrote: > On 2019-Jul-10, Bruce Momjian wrote: > >> Good, so I think we all now agree we have to put the nonce >> (pg_class.oid, LSN, page-number) though the cipher using the secret. (been traveling -- just trying to get caught up on this thread) > Actually, why do you need the page number in the nonce? The LSN already > distinguishes pages -- you can't have two pages with the same LSN, can > you? (I do think you can have multiple writes of the same page with > different LSNs, if you change hint bits and don't write WAL about it, Do you mean "multiple writes of the same page without..."? > but maybe we should force CRC enabled in encrypted tables, which I think > closes this hole?) If we can use the LSN (perhaps with CRC) without the page number that would seem to be a good idea. Joe -- Crunchy Data - http://crunchydata.com PostgreSQL Support for Secure Enterprises Consulting, Training, & Open Source Development
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