Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 29738.1342813515@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers) (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re:
Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)
|
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes: > I don't particularly care for that solution; it seems like a kludge. > I've kind of wondered whether we ought to have checks in all the ALTER > routines that spit up if you try to ALTER an extension member from any > place other than an extension upgrade script... but that still > wouldn't prevent the extension owner from dropping the members out of > the extension and then modifying them afterwards. I'm not sure we > want to prevent that in general, but maybe there could be some > locked-down mode that has that effect. Right, I wasn't too clear about that, but I meant that we'd have some sort of locked-down state for an extension that would forbid fooling with its contents. For development purposes, or for anybody that "knows what they're doing", adding/subtracting/modifying member objects is mighty handy. But a non-superuser who's loaded an extension that contains C functions ought not have those privileges for it. regards, tom lane
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