Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 2897.1094584168@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow (David Garamond <lists@zara.6.isreserved.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow
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Список | pgsql-general |
David Garamond <lists@zara.6.isreserved.com> writes: > Tom Lane wrote: >> Also, MD5 hashing is fast enough that I'm not sure the above is really >> significantly cheaper than a straight brute-force attack, ie, you just >> take your list of possible passwords and compute the hashes on the fly. >> The hashes are going to be much longer than the average real-world >> password, so reading in a list of hashes is going to take several times >> as much I/O as reading the passwords --- seems to me that it'd be >> cheaper just to re-hash each password. > Many people use short and easy-to-guess passwords (remember we're not > talking about the superuser only here), so the dictionary attack can be > more effective than people think. And that responds to the speed argument how? I quite agree that a guessable password is risky, but putting in a random salt offers no real advantage if the salt has to be stored in the same place as the encrypted password. regards, tom lane
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