Re: So we're in agreement....
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: So we're in agreement.... |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 2319.957801750@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: So we're in agreement.... (Philip Warner <pjw@rhyme.com.au>) |
Ответы |
Re: So we're in agreement....
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Philip Warner <pjw@rhyme.com.au> writes: > To solve (2) it seems to me that a slightly more complex interaction must > be undertaken using a public key algorithm: > - Client sends [username] to server > - Server sends [public key] to client > - Client sends [enc(public key, password)] to server. > - server uses dec(secret key,enc) and computes MD5 hash of password, > comparing it to pg_shadow. Hmm. The main problem with this is that once we get into having actual encryption/decryption code in Postgres, we are going to run afoul of US export regulations and other headaches. MD5 doesn't pose that problem because it's only a hashing algorithm not an encryptor. I see your point though, that requiring the client to send something one step upstream from what's stored in pg_shadow would make it harder to do anything useful by stealing pg_shadow. Can we get the same result with just MD5 operations? One possibility that comes to mind is that we store MD5(MD5(password)) in pg_shadow, and expect the client to transmit MD5(password). Of course that needs a cloaking scheme if you want to protect against password sniffing, but offhand it seems that the same scheme Ben Adida proposed should still work... > Additionally, it may be good to allow the entire client/server comms to be > done as an encrypted interaction, since a man-in-the-middle may not be able > to read the password, but they will be able to read the data... We have SSL capability already. I don't feel an urge to reinvent SSL. regards, tom lane
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