Re: Proof of concept: standalone backend with full FE/BE protocol
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: Proof of concept: standalone backend with full FE/BE protocol |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 23137.1346699422@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Proof of concept: standalone backend with full FE/BE protocol (Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>) |
Ответы |
Re: Proof of concept: standalone backend with full FE/BE protocol
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net> writes: > On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 8:51 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: >> I have another question after thinking about that for awhile: is there >> any security concern there? On Unix-oid systems, we expect the kernel >> to restrict who can do a kill() on a postgres process. If there's any >> similar restriction on who can send to that named pipe in the Windows >> version, it's not obvious from the code. Do we have/need any >> restriction there? > We use the default for CreateNamedPipe() which is: > " The ACLs in the default security descriptor for a named pipe grant > full control to the LocalSystem account, administrators, and the > creator owner. They also grant read access to members of the Everyone > group and the anonymous account." > (ref: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365150(v=vs.85).aspx) Hm. The write protections sound fine ... but what's the semantics of reading, is it like Unix pipes? If so, couldn't a random third party drain the pipe by reading from it, and thereby cause signals to be lost? regards, tom lane
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