Re: Cross-backend signals and administration (Was: Re: pg_terminate_backend for same-role)
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: Cross-backend signals and administration (Was: Re: pg_terminate_backend for same-role) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 22386.1332943341@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Cross-backend signals and administration (Was: Re: pg_terminate_backend for same-role) ("Kevin Grittner" <Kevin.Grittner@wicourts.gov>) |
Ответы |
Re: Cross-backend signals and administration (Was: Re:
pg_terminate_backend for same-role)
|
Список | pgsql-hackers |
"Kevin Grittner" <Kevin.Grittner@wicourts.gov> writes: > Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote: >> On Tuesday, March 27, 2012 07:51:59 PM Kevin Grittner wrote: >>> As Tom pointed out, if there's another person sharing the user ID >>> you're using, and you don't trust them, their ability to cancel >>> your session is likely way down the list of concerns you should >>> have. >> Hm. I don't think that is an entirely valid argumentation. The >> same user could have entirely different databases. They even could >> have distinct access countrol via the clients ip. >> I have seen the same cluster being used for prod/test instances at >> smaller shops several times. >> >> Whether thats a valid usecase I have no idea. > Well, that does sort of leave an arguable vulnerability. Should the > same user only be allowed to kill the process from a connection to > the same database? I don't see a lot of merit in this argument either. If joeseviltwin can connect as joe to database A, he can also connect as joe to database B in the same cluster, and then do whatever damage he wants. Fundamentally, if two users are sharing the same userid, *they are the same user* as far as Postgres is concerned. It's just silly to make protection decisions on the assumption that they might not be. If a DBA does not like the consequences of that, the solution is obvious. regards, tom lane
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