Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
От | Bruce Momjian |
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Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20190815152126.GD25063@momjian.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) (Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>) |
Ответы |
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 11:24:46AM +0200, Antonin Houska wrote: > > I think there are several directions we can go after all-cluster > > encryption, > > I think I misunderstood. What you summarize in > > https://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/Transparent_Data_Encryption#TODO_for_Full-Cluster_Encryption > > does include > > https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAD21AoBjrbxvaMpTApX1cEsO=8N=nc2xVZPB0d9e-VjJ=YaRnw@mail.gmail.com > > i.e. per-tablespace keys, right? Then the collaboration should be easier than > I thought. No, there is a single tables/indexes key and a WAL key, plus keys for rotation. I explained why per-tablespace keys don't add much value. -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Ancient Roman grave inscription +
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