Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
От | Alvaro Herrera |
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Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20190729200951.GA21847@alvherre.pgsql обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 2019-Jul-27, Bruce Momjian wrote: > I think using LSN and page number, we will _never_ reuse the IV, except > for cases like promoting two standbys, which I think we have to document > as an insecure practice. Actually, why is it an insecure practice? If you promote two standbys, then the encrypted pages are the same pages, so it's not two different messages with the same key/IV -- they're still *one* message. And as soon as they start getting queries, they will most likely diverge because the LSNs of records after the promotion will (most likely) no longer match. It takes one different WAL record length for the "encryption histories" to diverge completely ... -- Álvaro Herrera https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/ PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
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