Re: BUG #15911: Why no Bcrypt in pg_hba.conf?
От | raf |
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Тема | Re: BUG #15911: Why no Bcrypt in pg_hba.conf? |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20190716232242.bvdu6w7jnk3fj237@raf.org обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: BUG #15911: Why no Bcrypt in pg_hba.conf? (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: BUG #15911: Why no Bcrypt in pg_hba.conf?
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Список | pgsql-bugs |
Tom Lane wrote: > Andrew Gierth <andrew@tao11.riddles.org.uk> writes: > > "PG" == PG Bug reporting form <noreply@postgresql.org> writes: > > PG> Can you please add `bcrypt` as method option? > > > Not unless it gets added to the SCRAM specification. > > > Note that our primary goal here is to provide a secure and standard > > challenge-response authentication mechanism, not to provide random > > alternate algorithms for password storage. > > Worth noting here is that for us, the price of an additional > authentication mechanism is very high, because it's not just a matter > of adding some code to the server. Client-side libraries also need to > be taught about it, and most of those are not maintained by the core > PG project. So it takes years to make anything happen --- the > addition of SCRAM is still a work in progress, for example. > > Thus, we aren't going to add stuff on a whim, and when we do add some > new mechanism, there has to be a really solid argument that it's a > *significant* advance over what we have. > > regards, tom lane bcrypt is better than pbkdf2 but pbkdf2 is still good for the same reasons that bcrypt is good (brute force resistance). if you want bcrypt/scrypt/argon2, pbkdf2 will probably be good enough. and some organisations may require pbkdf2 because it is NIST-approved while the others aren't. cheers, raf
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