Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
От | Bruce Momjian |
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Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20190715220537.ac2m5aobnjzoferb@momjian.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) (Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 10:44:34PM +0200, Tomas Vondra wrote: > On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 03:55:38PM -0400, Bruce Momjian wrote: > > The crazy seems more sane now --- "encrypt the page with CRC contents as > > zero" (which we probably already do to compute the CRC), then compute > > the CRC, and modify the page CRC. > > > > Huh? So you want to > > 1) set CRC to 0 > 2) encrypt the page > 3) compute CRC > 4) set CRC to value computed in (3) > 5) encrypt the page again > > That seems pretty awful from performance POV, and it does not really > solve much as we'd still need to decrypt the page while verifying the > checksums (because the CRC is in the page header, which is encrypted). No, I was thinking we would overwrite whatever the encrypted output was in the spot that has the CRC with the computed CRC. Yeah, sounds even crazier now that I said it --- never mind. -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Ancient Roman grave inscription +
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