Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
От | Bruce Momjian |
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Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20190710200840.djev7sykob52ifvy@momjian.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) (Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 03:53:55PM -0400, Alvaro Herrera wrote: > On 2019-Jul-10, Bruce Momjian wrote: > > > Good, so I think we all now agree we have to put the nonce > > (pg_class.oid, LSN, page-number) though the cipher using the secret. > > Actually, why do you need the page number in the nonce? The LSN already > distinguishes pages -- you can't have two pages with the same LSN, can > you? (I do think you can have multiple writes of the same page with > different LSNs, if you change hint bits and don't write WAL about it, > but maybe we should force CRC enabled in encrypted tables, which I think > closes this hole?) Uh, what if a transaction modifies page 0 and page 1 of the same table --- don't those pages have the same LSN. -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Ancient Roman grave inscription +
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