Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
От | Bruce Momjian |
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Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20190710184144.7ocp4zs65njd2w6i@momjian.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) (Ryan Lambert <ryan@rustprooflabs.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 12:38:02PM -0600, Ryan Lambert wrote: > > what is it that gets stored in the page for > decryption use, the nonce or the IV derived from it? > > > I believe storing the IV is preferable and still secure per [1]: "The IV need > not be secret" > > Beyond needing the database oid, if every decrypt function has to regenerate > the IV from the nonce that will affect performance. I don't know how expensive > the forward hash is but it won't be free. Well, I think we have three options. We have 3 4-byte integers (pg_class.oid, LSN, page-number) that could be concatenated to be the IV, we could run those through a hash, or we could run them through the encryption function with the secret. -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Ancient Roman grave inscription +
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