Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
От | Alvaro Herrera |
---|---|
Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20190706031552.GA15149@alvherre.pgsql обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 2019-Jul-05, Bruce Momjian wrote: > On Fri, Jul 5, 2019 at 05:00:42PM -0400, Bruce Momjian wrote: > > On Fri, Jul 5, 2019 at 04:24:54PM -0400, Alvaro Herrera wrote: > > > Oh, is that the idea? I was kinda assuming that the data was kept > > > as-stored in shared buffers, ie. it would be decrypted on access, not on > > > read from disk. The system seems very prone to leakage if you have it > > > decrypted in shared memory. > > > > Well, the overhead of decrypting on every access will make the slowdown > > huge, and I don't know what security value that would have. I am not > > sure what security value TDE itself has, but I think encrypting shared > > buffer contents has even less. > > Sorry I didn't answer your question directly. Since the shared buffers > are in memory, if the decryption key is also unlocked in memory, there > isn't much value to encrypting shared buffers, and the overhead would be > huge. Oh, I get your point now. -- Álvaro Herrera https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/ PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
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