Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 04:49:34PM +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
> >> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 6:57 AM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> >> So on the whole I think that crypto is a poor fit for the DBAs-are-the-
> >> threat threat model.  It's better to reduce the number of DBAs/sysadmins
> >> and audit all privileged (and, for good measure, unprivileged) access.
> 
> I agree with this. The in-database data encryption can defend mainly
> the threat of storage theft and the threat of memory dump attack. I'm
> sure this design had been proposed for the former purpose. If we want
> to defend the latter we must encrypt data even on database memory. To
> be honest, I'm not sure that there is needs in practice that is user
> want to defend the memory dump attack. What user often needs is to
> defend the threat of storage theft with minimum performance overhead.
> It's known that client-side encryption or encryption on database
> memory increase additional performance overheads. So it would be
> better to have several ways to defend different threats as Joe
> mentioned.

If you can view memory you can't really trust the server and have to do
encryption client-side.

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             http://enterprisedb.com

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