Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
От | Bruce Momjian |
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Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20180620210925.GD17551@momjian.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 09:49:20AM -0400, Robert Haas wrote: > figure stuff out. You can infer something about the length of > particular values. Perhaps you can find cases where the same > encrypted value appears multiple times. If there's a btree index, you Most encryption methods use a random initialization vector (IV) for each encryption, e.g. pgp_sym_encrypt(), but length might allow this, as you stated. > know the ordering of the values under whatever ordering semantics > apply to that index. It's unclear to me how useful such information I don't think an ordered index is possible, only indexing of encrypted hashes, i.e. see this and the next slide: https://momjian.us/main/writings/crypto_hw_use.pdf#page=86 > would be in practice or to what extent it might allow you to attack > the underlying cryptography, but it seems like there might be cases > where the information leakage is significant. For example, suppose > you're trying to determine which partially-encrypted record is that of > Aaron Aardvark... or this guy: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubert_Blaine_Wolfeschlegelsteinhausenbergerdorff,_Sr. > > Recently, it was suggested to me that a use case for column-level > encryption might be to prevent casual DBA snooping. So, you'd want > the data to appear in pg_dump output encrypted, because the DBA might > otherwise look at it, but you wouldn't really be concerned about the > threat of the DBA loading a hostile C module that would steal user > keys and use them to decrypt all the data, because they don't care > that much and would be fired if they were caught doing it. Yes, that is a benefit that is not possible with page-level encryption. It also encrypts the WAL and backups automatically; see: http://momjian.us/main/writings/crypto_hw_use.pdf#page=97 -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Ancient Roman grave inscription +
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