Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superusercheck

On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 05:52:51PM -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 5:39 PM, David Fetter <david@fetter.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 08:50:27AM -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> >> On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 10:31 PM, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net> wrote:
> >> > Frankly, I get quite tired of the argument essentially being made
> >> > here that because pg_ls_dir() wouldn't grant someone superuser
> >> > rights, that we should remove superuser checks from everything.
> >> > As long as you are presenting it like that, I'm going to be quite
> >> > dead-set against any of it.
> >> 1. pg_ls_dir.  I cannot see how this can ever be used to get
> >> superuser privileges.
> >
> > With pilot error, all things are possible.  A file name under $PGDATA
> > could be the superuser password.
> 
> Uh, true.  The default value of application_name could be the
> superuser password, too, but we still allow access to it by
> unprivileged users.

Of course.

Best,
David.
-- 
David Fetter <david(at)fetter(dot)org> http://fetter.org/
Phone: +1 415 235 3778  AIM: dfetter666  Yahoo!: dfetter
Skype: davidfetter      XMPP: david(dot)fetter(at)gmail(dot)com

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