Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check
От | Stephen Frost |
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Тема | Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20170125191345.GN9812@tamriel.snowman.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Robert, * Robert Haas (robertmhaas@gmail.com) wrote: > Also, the same argument could be made about removing the built-in > superuser check from ANY function, and we've already rejected that > argument for a bunch of other functions. If we say that argument is > valid for some functions but not others, then we've got to decide for > which ones it's valid and for which ones it isn't, and consensus will > not be forthcoming. I take the position that hard-coded superuser > checks stink in general, and I'm grateful to Stephen for his work > making dump/restore work properly on system catalog permissions so > that we can support better alternatives. I'm not asking for anything > more than that we apply that same policy here as we have in other > cases. I went over *every* superuser check in the system when I did that work, wrote up a long email about why I made the decisions that I did, posted it here, had follow-on discussions, all of which lead to the patch which ended up going in. I am not anxious to revisit that decision and certainly not based on an argument that, so far, boils down to "I think a monitoring system might be able to use this function that allows it to read pg_authid directly, so we should drop the superuser() check in it." Thanks! Stephen
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