Re: exposing pg_controldata and pg_config as functions
От | Andres Freund |
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Тема | Re: exposing pg_controldata and pg_config as functions |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20160118094340.GQ10941@awork2.anarazel.de обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: exposing pg_controldata and pg_config as functions (Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: exposing pg_controldata and pg_config as functions
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 2016-01-18 10:18:34 +0900, Michael Paquier wrote: > We are trying to hide away from non-superusers WAL-related information > in system views and system function, that's my point to do the same > here. We are? pg_current_xlog_insert_location(), pg_current_xlog_location(), pg_is_xlog_replay_paused(), pg_stat_bgwriter ... are all non-superuser? > For the data of pg_control, it seems to me that this can give > away to any authorized users hints regarding the way Postgres is > built, perhaps letting people know for example which Linux > distribution is used and which flavor of Postgres is used (we already > give away some information with version() but that's different than > the libraries this is linking to), so an attacker may be able to take > advantage of that to do attacks on potentially outdated packages? And > I would think that many users are actually going to revoke the access > of those functions to public if we are going to make them > world-visible. It is easier as well to restrict things first, and then > relax if necessary, than the opposite as well. Meh, that seems pretty far into pseudo security arguments. Greetings, Andres Freund
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