Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users
От | Bruce Momjian |
---|---|
Тема | Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20150829202712.GD28360@momjian.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users
Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 12:57:58PM -0400, Tom Lane wrote: > Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> writes: > > On 2015-07-07 12:03:36 -0400, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > >> I think the DN is analogous to the remote user name, which we don't > >> expose for any of the other authentication methods. > > > Huh? > > Peter's exactly right: there is no other case where you can tell what > some other connection's actual OS username is. You might *guess* that > it's the same as their database username, but you don't know that, > assuming you don't know how they authenticated. > > I'm not sure how security-critical this info really is, though. I know I am coming in late here, but I know Heroku uses random user names to allow a cluster to have per-user databases without showing external user name details: => \du List of roles Role name | Attributes | Memberof----------------+------------------------------------------------+----------- aafgrwewediiqz | 20 connections | {} aaszwkfnholarh | 20 connections | {} aatbelxbaeriwy | 20connections | {} aaxiwolkcxmbxo | 20 connections | {} abbyljzgqaonjb| 20 connections | {} I can see them having problems with a user being able to see the SSL remote user names of all connected users. -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + Everyone has their own god. +
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