Re: Default Roles
От | Stephen Frost |
---|---|
Тема | Re: Default Roles |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20150513112742.GL30322@tamriel.snowman.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Default Roles (Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
* Heikki Linnakangas (hlinnaka@iki.fi) wrote: > On 05/13/2015 06:07 AM, Stephen Frost wrote: > >This does change the XLOG functions to require pg_monitor, as discussed > >on the other thread where it was pointed out by Heikki that the XLOG > >location information could be used to extract sensitive information > >based on what happens during compression. > > That seems like an orthogonal issue, not something that should be > bundled in this patch. IIRC we didn't reach a consensus on what to > do about the compression-leaks-information issue. One idea was to > make it configurable on a per-table basis, and if we do that, > perhaps we don't need to restrict access to > pg_current_xlog_location() and friends. Alright, I'll pull it out. I see it's already been added to the open-items list, so we shouldn't forget about it. For my 2c, I'd much rather have the information restricted to a privileged role instead of having to disable the feature. Further, all tables need to be considered as having privileged information, not just systems ones like pg_authid, as the user might not have rights on the other columns or rows in the table. Thanks! Stephen
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