Re: Directory/File Access Permissions for COPY and Generic File Access Functions
От | Stephen Frost |
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Тема | Re: Directory/File Access Permissions for COPY and Generic File Access Functions |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20141029161911.GP28859@tamriel.snowman.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Directory/File Access Permissions for COPY and Generic File Access Functions (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: Directory/File Access Permissions for COPY and Generic File Access Functions
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
* Tom Lane (tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: > Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net> writes: > > * Alvaro Herrera (alvherre@2ndquadrant.com) wrote: > >> Users cannot create a hard link to a file they can't already access. > > > The specifics actually depend on (on Linux, at least) the value of > > /proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlink, which has existed in upstream since 3.6 > > (not sure about the RHEL kernels, though I expect they've incorporated > > it also at some point along the way). > > No such file in RHEL 6.6 :-(. Ouch. Although- have you tested when happens there? I wonder if they've decided it's not worth allowing ever or if they feel that it's not worth preventing and that security-concious software should check the link count as Andres suggests. > What the POSIX spec for link(2) says is > > [EACCES] > A component of either path prefix denies search permission, or the > requested link requires writing in a directory that denies write > permission, or the calling process does not have permission to access > the existing file and this is required by the implementation. Yeah, I didn't mean to imply that this was provided by POSIX and you're right to point out that we couldn't depend on this as it wouldn't be cross-platform anyway. Thanks, Stephen
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