Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security
От | Alvaro Herrera |
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Тема | Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20100219184116.GE5735@alvh.no-ip.org обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Tom Lane wrote: > Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@commandprompt.com> writes: > > Tom Lane wrote: > >> It looks to me like the code in AlterSetting() will allow an ordinary > >> user to blow away all settings for himself. Even those that are for > >> SUSET variables and were presumably set for him by a superuser. Isn't > >> this a security hole? I would expect that an unprivileged user should > >> not be able to change such settings, not even to the extent of > >> reverting to the installation-wide default. > > > Yes, it is, but this is not a new hole. This works just fine in 8.4 > > too: > > So I'd argue for changing it in 8.4 too. Understood. I'm starting to look at what this requires. -- Alvaro Herrera http://www.CommandPrompt.com/ The PostgreSQL Company - Command Prompt, Inc.
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