Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security
От | Alvaro Herrera |
---|---|
Тема | Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20091115193405.GA3677@alvh.no-ip.org обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Tom Lane wrote: > It looks to me like the code in AlterSetting() will allow an ordinary > user to blow away all settings for himself. Even those that are for > SUSET variables and were presumably set for him by a superuser. Isn't > this a security hole? I would expect that an unprivileged user should > not be able to change such settings, not even to the extent of > reverting to the installation-wide default. Yes, I completely overlooked the fact that users should not be able to blow away GUCs set by superuser. I can't handle this right now though, as I'm leaving in a couple of days and won't return until cca. Dec. 1st. If this can wait (and I think it does) then I'll handle it then; otherwise I'd appreciate if someone else could take a look and fix it. -- Alvaro Herrera http://www.CommandPrompt.com/ The PostgreSQL Company - Command Prompt, Inc.
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