Application specific installs
От | Jonathan Barnhart |
---|---|
Тема | Application specific installs |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20041214014044.56290.qmail@web53707.mail.yahoo.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответы |
Re: Application specific installs
|
Список | pgsql-hackers-win32 |
What you guys have done on the following issues is reasonable and makes sense from a lot of points of view. But Windows is a different animal and I am trying to field an actual commercial application that runs with Postgresql as its back end under Windows. I'm getting things to work in its current state where Posturesql is doing its multiuser database thing, but here is what is optimal from a single application approach when the application tends to be single user. First off, there needs to be a way to allow Posturesql to run as Administrator. Basically add a "do it anyway" flag to it. What is needed for this mode is that posturesql will allow 127.0.0.1 to connect to it when it's running as administrator. I do not see a need to allow outside connections in this mode. The reason for this is most people run their windows boxes as administrator because windows runs badly if you don't. So what I would be doing is starting Postgresql as a user process and not as a service or anything. Also this would allow me to have a "known good" postgresql for my own app regardless of what else has been installed as a service. Having fielded Oracle based apps and worse, BDE apps, version conflicts on the back end are very real and a royal pain from a support viewpoint. So anyway, do I have to fork the code to get my single user anything goes locally mode or is there some willingness to address "windows" issues here. Please remember I'm talking about a guy who goes down to Wal-mart. Buys a windows XP machine, and installs my product. He doesn't know beans about computers and I'm trying to make his life easy because if I don't he'll use someone else's product. I KNOW the way PG works now is more secure. But if you're only allowing local connections to PG running as administrator it's not that much of a risk since if it's being attacked locally things have already gone to hell in a hand-basket. ===== "We'll do the undoable, work the unworkable, scrute the inscrutable and have a long, hard look at the ineffable to see whetherit might not be effed after all"
В списке pgsql-hackers-win32 по дате отправления: