Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow
| От | Steve Atkins |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 20040908035956.GA23247@gp.word-to-the-wise.com обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow (Steve Atkins <steve@blighty.com>) |
| Ответы |
Re: Salt in encrypted password in pg_shadow
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| Список | pgsql-general |
On Tue, Sep 07, 2004 at 08:48:13PM -0700, Steve Atkins wrote: > That's an example of why a salt is still extremely valuable, despite > the change in CPU speed:storage speed/size ration But, to clarify, I don't see any practical problem in the current PostgreSQL implementation. It's not particularly secure, but not much worse than the underlying OS authentication. Most of the feasible attack trees are going to start with compromising the OS platform, by which point weaknesses in the postgresql authentication are fairly meaningless. If we need to tweak the authentication protocol _anyway_ at some point it'd be great to improve things. But until then... not worth the pain. Cheers, Steve
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