Re: Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int)
От | Oliver Jowett |
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Тема | Re: Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20030722063504.GA10522@opencloud.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int) (Barry Lind <blind@xythos.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int)
Re: Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int) |
Список | pgsql-jdbc |
On Mon, Jul 21, 2003 at 10:49:14PM -0700, Barry Lind wrote: > Given the ongoing discussion that this SQL injection vulnerability has > caused, I decided not to apply the below patch from Kim and instead > fixed the problem in a different way. The fix essentially applies the > regular escaping done for setString to appropriate values passed to > setObject. It does not however add quotes to the value. Thus existing > uses of setObject for in clause and array type values will still > continue to work. I haven't looked at the updated tree yet, but from your description won't this break code that does something like this? : stmt = conn.prepareStatement("SELECT * FROM table WHERE string_key IN ?"); stmt.setObject(1, "('a', 'b', 'c')", Types.NUMERIC); -O
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