Re: How to deny user changing his own password?
От | nolan@celery.tssi.com |
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Тема | Re: How to deny user changing his own password? |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20030529220918.6100.qmail@celery.tssi.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: How to deny user changing his own password? (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: How to deny user changing his own password?
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Список | pgsql-general |
> In short, I don't see any value in a password lock option either. It seems to me that if I can give a user 'read only' access to a database, I should be able to give 'read only' access in every aspect, including locking down the password. > And ISTM anyplace that used it would be getting in the way of good > password management practice. Users *should* be encouraged to change > their own passwords, and to do so regularly. No real argument there, but is an application a 'user' in the ordinary sense of the word? Would you, as DBA, prefer a locked-down password or one that you might have to change in dozens of locations? It seems me that the underlying issue of how to authenticate access from an 'outside' and compromiseable client may not be easily solveable. Locking down the password falls under the category of 'damage control'. ('Inside' clients can be compromised too, of course.) I'm not sure 'ident' solves the problem any better than an embedded password does, and the documentation on ident raises this red flag: This authentication method is therefore only appropriate for closed networks where each client machine is under tight control and where the database and system administrators operate in close contact. In other words, you must trust the machine running the ident server. Heed the warning: The Identification Protocol is not intended as an authorization or access control protocol. --RFC 1413 -- Mike Nolan
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