Security hole in PL/pgSQL

Damn,
   the  new  EXECUTE  command  in  PL/pgSQL  is a security hole.   PL/pgSQL is  a  trusted  procedural  language,
meaning that   regular  users  can  write  code  in it. With the new EXECUTE   command, someone could read and write
arbitrary files  under   the postgres UNIX-userid using the COPY command.
 
   So  it's  easy  to  overwrite the hba config file for regular   users. I think we have  to  restrict  the  usage  of
EXECUTE   inside  of  function  to DB superusers. Meaning, the owner of   the function using EXECUTE must be superuser,
notthe  actual   invoker.
 
   More  damned  - PL/Tcl has the same functionality since ever.   And there it isn't that easy to restrict, since it
hasa much   more generalized SPI interface. What do we do in this case?
 


Jan

--

#======================================================================#
# It's easier to get forgiveness for being wrong than for being right. #
# Let's break this rule - forgive me.                                  #
#================================================== JanWieck@Yahoo.com #



_________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com