Re: md5 again

> > > If CL sends the MD5 of the username rather than the plaintext username,
> > > only CL and PG will know what the username is.  PG will know it by 
> > > comparing it with the MD5 of every username in pg_shadow. So even if the
> > > wire is being sniffed the unhashed username can be used in the password's
> > > encryption along with the salt sent by PG.  This method will take longer
> > > for a user to log in, but the login process is only per session, not per
> > > SQL call.  
> > 
> > A linear search of pg_shadow to log in is not acceptable; we don't want
> > to make login any slower than we have to.  I see no real gain in security
> > from doing this anyway...
> 
> By knowing what PG will do with the username and random salt, sniffing 
> the wire can make guessing the password trivial.  If the username was
> never sent over the wire in the clear the unhashed username is an unknown
> salt to he who is sniffing.  But it's true that it would introduce a
> slower than necessary login.
> 

Does it?  I thought it was the password being run through MD5 that made
it secure.

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