Re: You're on SecurityFocus.com for the cleartext passwords.
От | Bruce Momjian |
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Тема | Re: You're on SecurityFocus.com for the cleartext passwords. |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 200005061857.OAA20779@candle.pha.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: You're on SecurityFocus.com for the cleartext passwords. (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: You're on SecurityFocus.com for the cleartext passwords.
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
> Probably the way to attack this would be to combine MD5 and this double > password-munging algorithm as a new authentication protocol type to add > to the ones we already support. That way old clients don't have to be > updated instantly. Not sure that will work because once we use md5 on the server side for pg_shadow, we have to be able to do md5 on the client, I think, for crypting because the md5 has to be done _before_ the random salt crypt. > > OTOH, if the password stored in pg_shadow is MD5-encrypted, then we lose > the ability to support the old crypt-based auth method, don't we? Yes. > Old clients could be successfully authenticated with cleartext password > challenge (server MD5's the transmitted password and compares to > pg_shadow), but we couldn't do anything with a crypt()-encrypted > password. Is that enough reason to stay with crypt() as the underlying > hashing engine? Maybe not, but we gotta consider the tradeoffs... Not sure. -- Bruce Momjian | http://www.op.net/~candle pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
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