Re: You're on SecurityFocus.com for the cleartext passwords.

> > The additional random salt prevents someone from sniffing
> > the communication between client and server and then simply log in by
> > sending the known hash of the password. The challenge-response means that
> > sniffing one login doesn't allow you to fake the next one.
> 
> How so?  The server sends out one fixed salt (the one stored for that
> user's password in pg_shadow) and one randomly-chosen salt.  The client
> sends back two crypted passwords.  The server can check one of them.
> What can it do with the other?  Nothing that I can see, so where is the
> security gain?  A sniffer can still get in by sending back the same
> pair of crypted passwords next time, no matter what random salt is
> presented.

No, you crypt the user-supplied password twice.
'fred' -> crypt with fixed -> crypt with random

Server does:
pg_shadow password -> crypt with random

Then check to see they match.

Does that help?

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