Re: A successor for PQgetssl
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: A successor for PQgetssl |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 18941.1145222944@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | A successor for PQgetssl (Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog@svana.org>) |
Ответы |
Re: A successor for PQgetssl
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog@svana.org> writes: > Do people like this idea? Not really ... > Note, I don't return a pointer to the GnuTLS session anywhere. I think > that's a bad idea all round and we need to provide another way for > programs to acheive the same effect. No, failing to provide that is the bad idea, because then you're buying into the notion that libpq will provide a universal API that will incorporate anything anyone could possibly want to do with the underlying SSL library. The above is *not* that, prima facie because it is read-only access. Even if this was a feasible goal, it would absorb a lot of time on our part that could be better spent elsewhere, plus a lot of time on the part of app programmers rewriting existing OpenSSL-aware or GnuTLS-aware code to instead use whatever random API we tell them they ought to use. They have better things to do with their time, too. > I've got it almost completely working and have tested interoperability. > ... > - This breaks psqlODBC when it uses libpq because it wants to use OpenSSL > and when libpq is compiled with GnuTLS that obviously won't work. That alone is sufficient reason why we're not going down that path. If we expose a GnuTLS-handle-fetching API then it's up to the ODBC guys to extend their code to handle that SSL library when they feel like it. But telling them that we're simply going to break their code and not provide them a path to fix it is not happening. regards, tom lane
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