Re: You're on SecurityFocus.com for the cleartext passwords.
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: You're on SecurityFocus.com for the cleartext passwords. |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 18107.957713320@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: You're on SecurityFocus.com for the cleartext passwords. (Hannu Krosing <hannu@tm.ee>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Hannu Krosing <hannu@tm.ee> writes: > One way to approach it in a semi-transparent way would be to add a > column md5passwd to pg_shadow and set up a trigger to automatically > update it whenever passwd is inserted/updated (and for > security-concious people the same trigger would empty the passwd > field itself, or set it to some special value that disables > crypt/cleartext logins) I don't think it's optional to get rid of the cleartext password; kindly recall the original complaint we are trying to address (see subject line of this thread ;-)). So there's little value in storing two columns. Also, by having just one password field we can deal with either cleartext or pre-encrypted incoming passwords fairly easily. The trigger either reformats the field, or not; no upstream code needs to worry about whether the password is already encrypted. So we don't need the "WITH ENCRYPTED PASSWORD" variant syntax, which is a good thing IMHO. > I still think that the easiest way to get unique hashes would be to use > the username as salt when generating the value for md5passwd . No, I don't think that's an improvement. Please recall that the original reason for inventing salt was to make sure that it wouldn't be obvious whether the same user was using the same password on multiple machines. Since MD5 can take an arbitrarily long input phrase, we could possibly run the calculation as MD5(password || username || random salt), but there *must* be some randomness in there. I doubt that it'd be all that great an idea to include the username. The biggest objection to it is that renaming a user would break his password (nonobviously, too). The only reason in favor of it is that it wouldn't be apparent when two different users share the same password --- but the random salt covers that problem and does more too. regards, tom lane
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