Re: [Bizgres-general] WAL bypass for INSERT, UPDATE and
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: [Bizgres-general] WAL bypass for INSERT, UPDATE and |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 17841.1136309852@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Bizgres-general] WAL bypass for INSERT, UPDATE and (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>) |
Ответы |
Re: [Bizgres-general] WAL bypass for INSERT, UPDATE and
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net> writes: > The problem is that you might want to grant 'truncate' to people who > *aren't* particularly trusted. For truncate, at least I have a > real-world use-case for it. I don't find this use-case particularly convincing. If the users are allowed to delete all data in a given table, then that table must be dedicated to them anyway; so it's not that easy to see why you can't risk giving them ownership rights on it. The worst they can do is screw up their own data, no? In any case, I don't see what's so wrong with the model of using SECURITY DEFINER interface functions when you want a security restriction that's finer-grain than the system provides. I really *don't* want to see us trying to, say, categorize every variety of ALTER TABLE as a separately grantable privilege. I could live with something like a catchall "ADMIN" privilege ... except it's not clear how that would differ from ownership. regards, tom lane
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