Re: postgres uptime
От | Tom Lane |
---|---|
Тема | Re: postgres uptime |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 16009.1092974977@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: postgres uptime ("Marc G. Fournier" <scrappy@postgresql.org>) |
Ответы |
Re: postgres uptime
|
Список | pgsql-hackers |
"Marc G. Fournier" <scrappy@postgresql.org> writes: > On Thu, 19 Aug 2004, Tom Lane wrote: >> I'd like to see more than one person requesting this (and with solider >> rationales) before it gets added to TODO. If I wanted to be picky I >> would suggest that knowledge of the server start time might be useful >> information to an attacker. It would for instance narrow down the >> number of possible starting seeds for the postmaster's random number >> generator. > Wouldn't an attacker have to have access to the server in the first place > to get that information? They'd only need SQL access to run the proposed uptime() function. The question is what they could parlay the information into --- perhaps the ability to break into a more-privileged database account, or maybe even the ability to break into other services on the same machine. It's not unreasonable to suppose that the postmaster start time tells you the most recent boot time of the server, and so you might be able to apply the same sort of I-know-the-random-seed attack to other daemons on the same machine. This is certainly all speculative. But I thought the rationale for clients wanting to know the postmaster start time in the first place was pretty dang thin. I am simply pointing out that this is not a zero-risk addition, and so we ought to ask just how much more than zero benefit it really has. regards, tom lane
В списке pgsql-hackers по дате отправления: