Re: Pragma autonomous transactions in Postgres/ Certification based authentication in DB Links
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: Pragma autonomous transactions in Postgres/ Certification based authentication in DB Links |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 1358972.1639760673@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Pragma autonomous transactions in Postgres/ Certification based authentication in DB Links (Jonathan Katz <jonathan.katz@excoventures.com>) |
Список | pgsql-sql |
Jonathan Katz <jonathan.katz@excoventures.com> writes: >> On Dec 17, 2021, at 11:27 AM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: >> The problem is >> that making use of any credentials stored in the server's filesystem >> amounts to impersonating the OS user that's running the server. It'd >> be nice to find a less confining solution, but I'm not sure what one >> would look like. > Even stepping back and just looking at what prompted the question, > i.e. “hardcoding the username/password”, if there was a way we could > allow for the injection of the credentials when we’re trying to establish > the connection, that may be one way forward, but I see that also > opening up a bunch more problems we would need to consider. One approach that's available now is to have dblink use a foreign server/foreign user mapping definition. Then the secret is stored in pg_user_mapping rather than in the SQL text, which is an improvement anyway. (If you want to complain about that, you have to be a little more specific about what your threat model is. Somebody who can peek into pg_user_mapping can probably get hold of credentials in the server's filesystem, too.) regards, tom lane
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