Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 13392.1485522813@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check (Simon Riggs <simon@2ndquadrant.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superusercheck
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Simon Riggs <simon@2ndquadrant.com> writes: > [ good general plan ] > 3. Make a list of all functions that would cause security problems. > One by one, precisely. If we did remove all superuser checks we would > need this list documented to advise people of the risks, so it must > exist before any commit can be made, assuming we believe in > documentation. Notice that I am after risk documentation, Yeah, I think documentation is the crux of the issue. If there is some non-obvious reason why letting somebody use pg_ls_dir() is more of a security hazard than it appears on the surface, the answer is to document that so DBAs can decide for themselves whether to take the risk. Count me +1 for removing hard-wired superuser checks, but carefully and with an overall plan. regards, tom lane
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